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THE CASE FOR SHAREHOLDER
ACCESS: A RESPONSE TO THE
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE
Lucian Arye Bebchukt
The Business Roundtable ("BRT"), an influential association of
CEOs of leading companies, has played a key role in opposing the
SEC proposal to provide shareholders with access to the corporate
ballot. In response to the SEC request for public comment, the BRT
filed an eighty-page letter comment, with hundreds of pages of ap-
pendices, in opposition to the proposed shareholder access rule.' Ac-
cording to media accounts, the BRT and its allies have also been us-
ing the considerable clout that they have to lobby against the pro-
posed rule. While this lobbying effort has thus far been successful in
discouraging the SEC from proceeding to adopt a shareholder access
rule, this article concerns the merits of the BRT position: it examines
whether the BRT has succeeded in putting forward good substantive
reasons for opposing shareholder access.
I have discussed in an earlier work the general case for share-
holder access to the corporate ballot in general and the SEC proposal
t William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and
Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School; Research
Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. This article was initially prepared for distri-
bution to participants at the SEC roundtable on shareholder nomination of directors on March
10, 2004, and it was subsequently presented at the Leet Business Law Symposium at Case
Western Reserve University. A version of this article will also appear in SHAREHOLDER
ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk ed., Harvard University Press 2005). I
am grateful to participants in the SEC roundtable and the Leet Business Law symposium for
helpful reactions and suggestions. I also would like to thank Kiwi Kamara and Rob Maynes for
their research assistance. For financial support, I am grateful to the Nathan Cummins Founda-
tion, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Busi-
ness.
I Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, The Business Roundtable, to Jonathan
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (December 22, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l903/s71903-381.pdf [hereinafter BRT Comment Letter].
The main arguments made in the BRT submission are also put forward in a paper by John
Castellani, the President of the BRT and Amy Goodman, who participated in drafting the BRT's
comment letter. See John J. Castellani & Amy L. Goodman,The Case Against the SEC Director
Election Proposal, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk
ed., Harvard University Press forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on file with the author).
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in particular.2 This article reconsiders the subject in light of the BRT
submission, and analyzes the wide range of objections raised by the
BRT. I start with an examination of the BRT's claims that there is
no need for reform, and I then proceed to consider the BRT's claims
that providing shareholders with any access to the corporate ballot
would have severe adverse consequences. Following a detailed ex-
amination of the BRT's various claims, my analysis concludes that
none of them provides a good basis for denying shareholders access
to the corporate ballot.
I. No NEED FOR REFORM?
A. The Empirical Claim
After challenging the Commission's authority to adopt the pro-
posed rule, the BRT proceeds to argue that there is no need for re-
form.3 The BRT begins by suggesting that the evidence contradicts
the view that reform is needed. In particular, the BRT argues that
"scant evidence is given that shareholders are in fact denied meaning-
ful participation in the proxy process under the current rules," and
that "[s]ubstantial evidence in the record, in fact, suggests the oppo-
site." 4
In claiming that the evidence suggests the opposite, the BRT relies
on the statistics concerning the incidence of "withhold" votes that the
Commission reported in its release. According to these statistics, the
incidence of withhold votes for one or more of the directors exceeds
35 percent in only 1.1 percent of companies. The BRT interprets this
low incidence of large withhold votes as evidence that shareholders
are content with board performance in the vast majority of companies.
Moreover, even for the small number of cases with withhold votes
exceeding 35 percent, the BRT claims that (i) cases in which only 35
percent of the shareholders withhold their votes should not be viewed
as a problem since incumbents still enjoy the support of a majority of
the shareholders, and (ii) even if the withhold vote in such cases were
viewed as reflecting the existence of a problem at the time of the vote,
the large withhold vote might commonly lead to management action
addressing the problem so that, again, no reform is needed.
2 See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus. LAW. 43
(2003).
3 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 1-22; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at 2-6.
4 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 23; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 2.
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Withhold votes register shareholder dissatisfaction but do not di-
rectly confront incumbents with a risk of removal. In the presence of
a quorum and the absence of a competing slate, the company's slate
will be elected regardless of the number of withhold votes. Incum-
bents face a risk of replacement only when a rival slate competes for
shareholder support. The possibility of such a replacement, it is
worth reminding, plays a key role in the accepted theory of the corpo-
ration. The viability of such replacement when shareholders are dis-
satisfied with board performance is supposed to provide a critical
safety valve.
The evidence that the BRT overlooks is the negligible incidence of
electoral challenges outside the hostile takeover context. The BRT
seems to believe that there is a meaningful incidence of such chal-
lenges. It argues that "[i]n fact, shareholders have used the Commis-
sion's existing rules to launch election contests on numerous occa-
sions," and it supports this claim by listing several examples of well-
known contests.5 Although such examples do exist, they are drawn
from a rather small group of cases.
In a recent empirical study, I examined the incidence of contested
solicitations in the seven-year period 1996-2002.6 During this seven-
year period, 215 contested proxy solicitations took place, about 30 per
year on average. The majority of the contested solicitations, however,
did not involve attempts to replace the board with a new team that
would run the firm differently. About a quarter of the contests did not
involve director elections at all, but concerned other matters such as
proposed bylaw amendments. Among contests over the election of
directors, a majority involved a fight over a possible sale of the com-
pany or over a possible opening or restructuring of a closed-end fund.
Contests over the team that would run the (stand-alone) firm in the
future occurred in about 80 companies, among the thousands that are
publicly traded, during the seven-year period 1996-2002.
Furthermore, most of the firms in which such contests occurred
were small. Of the firms in which such contests occurred, only 10
firms had, in the year of the contested solicitation, a market capitali-
zation exceeding $200 million. Thus, the incidence of such contests
for firms with a market capitalization exceeding $200 million was
remarkably low-less than two per year on average.
Of course, the BRT could respond to the above evidence in a way
similar to how it reacted to the low incidence of large withhold votes
5 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 25; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 4.
6 See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 45-46.
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reported by the Commission. The dearth of electoral challenges, the
BRT might argue, simply reflects the negligible incidence of compa-
nies with widespread shareholder dissatisfaction; electoral challenges
are generally not mounted, so the argument goes, simply because
shareholder satisfaction with their board makes running a competing
slate futile. However, while shareholder satisfaction might substan-
tially contribute to the extreme dearth of electoral challenges, it is
implausible that it fully accounts for it. With thousands of publicly
traded companies, how plausible is it that widespread shareholder
dissatisfaction occurs in any given year in only ten companies or
so-and in only two companies or so with a market capitalization
exceeding $200 million? It is highly plausible that the practically
non-existent incidence of electoral challenges stems in part from the
costs and impediments that challengers face even when shareholders
are dissatisfied.
Imagine that you visit a country, let us call it Corporatia, and you
find that it has 10,000 towns and that in almost all of them the incum-
bent members of the city council run unopposed in town elections,
with a competing slate running in only about 10 towns in any given
election year. You will be unlikely to view this state of affairs as
evidence that city councils do a terrific job across the numerous towns
of Corporatia. You will be more likely to suspect that the dearth of
electoral challenges is at least partly due to some impediments con-
fronting potential challengers in Corporatia.7
Returning from the imaginary land of Corporatia to our capital
markets, an inference that the dearth of electoral challenges is due in
part to the impediments facing challengers is also supported by any
realistic assessment of the challengers' situation. Challengers cur-
rently cannot place their candidates on the ballot sent by the company
to all shareholders, but rather must incur the costs involved in getting
their proxy cards to shareholders independently. Further, challengers
must bear all of the "campaign" costs involved in effectively commu-
nicating their case to the shareholders, whereas incumbents may
spend substantial amounts from the company treasury. The share-
holder access proposal is simply a step to reduce-still falling far
short of leveling the playing field-the disadvantages that challengers
now face.
7 Would the concern of a visitor to Corporatia go away if the visitor were to learn that its
citizens have the option of casting blank ballots and that in only 1.1% of the towns the percent-
age of blank ballots exceeds 35 percent? Such inference would be unlikely, especially if the
casting of blank ballots can register dissatisfaction but cannot prevent the re-election of incum-
bents.
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In sum, the empirical evidence indicates that electoral challenges
are practically non-existent. This evidence suggests, and examination
of the basic features of the corporate elections system confirms, that
this state of affairs is in part due to the substantial disadvantages chal-
lengers now face. The safety valve of the shareholder franchise is
currently not working. As long as we continue to maintain the view
that shareholder power to replace the board is an important element of
corporate structure, we need reform that would turn this power from
myth into reality.
B. Other Protections
The BRT also agues that, even if flaws in current arrangements
make electoral threats not viable, shareholders have other adequate
protections that make reform unnecessary.
1. Voting with One's Feet
The BRT argues that shareholders dissatisfied with incumbent di-
rectors can "'vote with their feet' by selling the company's stock." 8
"[A]n investor dissatisfied with a corporation's board of directors,"
the BRT suggests, "easily can redirect his or her capital to a preferred
alternative." 9 This observation leads the BRT to take the view that
"[t]he purest form of corporate suffrage takes place in the capital mar-
kets, not through regulatory action."' 0
The ability of shareholders to sell their shares on the market, how-
ever, is hardly a substitute for a viable route for replacing directors.
Consider shareholders that believe that their board is and has been
under-performing and that, as a result of this poor performance, the
company's stock price is only $40 per share rather than the $60 per
share it would be with adequate board performance. If the board per-
formance cannot be improved, being able to sell shares on the market
would not address the shareholders' problem: selling would still pro-
vide them with only $40 per share rather than the $60 per share their
stock would fetch with adequate board performance. Thus, for share-
holders concerned that poor board performance is reducing the value
of their investments, the freedom to sell their shares is not an ade-
quate remedy.
8 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 24-25; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at 3.
9 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 25 n.128; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at note 7.
10 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 25; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 3.
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2. Relying on Independent Directors
The BRT also stresses that shareholders are protected by the
dominant presence of independent directors on the board. Rather than
run an opposing slate, shareholders that seek to add a new director
"may submit director candidates to the board's independent nominat-
ing committee." 1  Like other opponents of the shareholder access
proposal, the BRT stresses that recent changes in stock exchange re-
quirements and corporate practices have increased the dominance and
power of independent directors on boards and nominating commit-
tees. 12
Although the recent strengthening of director independence might
well be beneficial, it does not obviate the need for the safety valve of
a viable mechanism for shareholder replacement of directors. The
mere independence of directors from insiders ensures neither that
directors are well selected nor that they have the right incentives to
advance shareholder interests.
Indeed, even assuming that strengthened independence of directors
will often lead to good nomination decisions, a safety valve is still
necessary. Recent reforms cannot be expected to completely elimi-
nate cases in which nominating committees fail to make desirable
replacements of incumbent directors. With due respect to the benefits
of director independence, it should not lead us to accept a state of
affairs in which self-perpetuating boards confront no meaningful
threat of replacement. The safety valve of replacement by sharehold-
ers remains indispensable notwithstanding the strengthening of direc-
tors' independence. The evidence that this safety valve is not work-
ing warrants reform.
II. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES?
The BRT argues that, while the proposed shareholder access rule
would not provide any benefits, simply because the flaws it seeks to
address do not exist, it would have considerable adverse conse-
quences.
A. The Distortion of Shareholder Access Resolutions
To begin, the BRT argues that access to the shareholder access ar-
rangement would be triggered "far more often than the Commission
II BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 24; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 3.
12 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 26-27, 49; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at 4-6.
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supposes" and far more often than shareholder interests warrant. 13
The proposed rule displays considerable caution in that it seeks to
limit the availability of shareholder access to cases with clear evi-
dence of widespread shareholder support for such an arrangement or
widespread shareholder dissatisfaction. But the BRT argues that the
passage of shareholder access resolutions would not reflect a judg-
ment by most shareholders that such an arrangement would serve
shareholder interests. According to the BRT, the Commission has
failed to consider the presence of two factors that might lead to the
adoption of shareholder access resolutions that do not serve share-
holder interests: (i) the "collateral objectives" of some institutional
investors who might bring and support shareholder access resolutions
to advance some special interests, and (ii) the "influence of proxy
advisory services" whose recommendations are followed automati-
cally by many shareholders. 14 I shall consider in order the BRT's
claims with respect to each one of the se factors.
1. Barbarians at the Gate: State and Labor Union Funds
The BRT notes that "[s]tate and labor union pension funds are
among the principal advocates of the [proposed rule]."'15 It expresses
concern that union pension funds are using their holdings to pressure
companies on such traditional labor concerns as wages, unionization,
and benefits, and that state pension funds are using their holdings to
press for "social" issues (such as environmental protection).16 In the
view of the BRT, union and state pension funds can be expected to
put forward and vote for shareholder election proposals in order to
"advance special interests of their own that are unrelated to the open-
,,17
ness of the proxy process.
Accepting that union and state pension funds have such "collateral
objectives," however, hardly indicates that such collateral objectives
would lead to the passage of shareholder resolutions that do not have
widespread support among shareholders that are solely interested in
enhancing share value. In the vast majority of companies, union and
state pension funds have holdings that are far too small to ensure the
13 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 27; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 6.
14 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 28; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at 6.
135 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 30; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 9.
16 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 31-32; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at 9-10.
17 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 31; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 9.
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passage of shareholder access proposals or even to have a major ef-
fect on the outcome of a vote.' 8 As a result, shareholder access pro-
posals would pass only when drawing large support from institutional
and other shareholders that are solely concerned with share value.
Indeed, past voting patterns clearly indicate that shareholder reso-
lutions that are brought because of their appeal to shareholders with
special interests generally do not pass. Shareholder resolutions that
focus on social or labor issues generally fail. Shareholder proposals
that have attracted majority support, such as those calling for repeal
of staggered boards, have generally been ones that are viewed by pro-
fessional money managers (correctly or incorrectly) as clearly serving
shareholder value.
2. Barbarians at the Gate: The ISS
The BRT argues that the Commission has failed to take into ac-
count "the role of proxy voting guidelines in determining the voting
practices of many institutional investors."'19 Employee benefits plans,
which are among the most significant investors in the capital markets,
are required to vote proxies as part of their duties as plan fiduciaries.
Confronting the need to make voting decisions in numerous compa-
nies, such institutional investors do not make case-by-case decisions.
Rather, they largely follow voting guidelines that they develop either
on their own or by using the guidelines of Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) or some other proxy advisory service. ISS, the cur-
rently leading proxy advisory service, is viewed as having pervasive
influence on the voting decisions of many institutional investors.2°
Therefore, the BRT argues, a widespread adoption of shareholder
access resolutions might result not from shareholders' genuine judg-
ment that such a regime will serve their interests, but rather as a result
of an ISS recommendation to support such resolutions.2'
18 Damon Silvers and Michael Garland present some data that nicely illustrates this point.
According to their data, in the eight firms that submitted comment letters opposed to share-
holder access, the largest union or state pension fund holds less than .75% of the company's
shares. See Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for
Proxy Access, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk ed.,
Harvard University Press 2005).
Indeed, in many companies the fraction of shares held by union and state pension funds,
which might have "collateral objectives" inducing them to vote in favor of shareholder access
proposal, is smaller than the fraction of shares held by the company's insiders, who might have
"collateral objectives" inducing them to vote against shareholder access proposals.
I9 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 28; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 6.
20 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 28-29; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at 7-8.
21 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 30; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
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It is difficult to predict accurately what voting policies institutions
will develop following the adoption of the proposed access rule. ISS
has stated that it will make recommendations on a case-by-case basis.
Institutional investors, as well as their proxy advisers, may also de-
velop voting policies that tie voting on shareholder access resolutions
to some governance or performance parameters that they view as im-
portant. For example, an institutional investor may adopt a policy of
voting for shareholder access proposals if and only if a board's per-
formance is highly unsatisfactory in terms of some easily checked
criterion-e.g., the company's under-performing its peers for a suffi-
ciently long period of time, restating its earnings, failing to tie pay to
performance in any way, and so forth. After all, while institutional
investors disfavor staggered boards, shareholder resolutions to repeal
staggered boards have been brought and have passed in only a small
fraction of the companies with staggered boards.
While it is difficult to predict how many shareholder access resolu-
tions will pass if the proposed rule is adopted, it is safe to assume that
a widespread adoption would not result from a capricious, arbitrary
decision by ISS rather than from the emergence of a widespread con-
sensus for shareholder access among institutional investors. Given
the attention that the shareholder access issue has received, it is
unlikely that institutional investors will not have an informed view
about it but rather will feel the need to follow thoughtlessly the rec-
ommendations of a proxy advisor. Institutional investors will likely
be exposed to a range of recommendations and views about the sub-
ject, and they will have little reason to adopt a policy of generally
voting for access proposals unless they view such proposals as value-
enhancing.
In sum, one cannot rule out the possibility that shareholders will
approve a large number of shareholder access resolutions. This could
happen if, as experience accumulates over time, a consensus in favor
of shareholder access emerges within the investment community.
What can be ruled out, however, is the possibility of widespread
adoption of such arrangements without genuine and widespread sup-
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B. Trojan Horses: Special Interest Candidates on the Ballot
The BRT suggests that the "greatest harm threatened by [the] pro-
posed rules ... may well be the prospect ... of 'special interest' and
'single issue' campaigns and candidates. 22 In the BRT's view, can-
didates nominated by shareholders with a special interest will be ones
that "share a common policy objective" and, once elected, these
shareholder nominees will put this objective "ahead of the corporate
well-being as a whole., 23 Thus, the BRT raises the concern that a
shareholder with interest in certain "social investment policies" will
nominate a candidate with "shared sympathies" toward such policies
and that, once elected, the candidate will pursue these policies in a
manner that "could have a debilitating effect on ... the vitality of the
company as a whole.
' 24
The BRT suggests that the prospect of candidates nominated by
union pension funds "warrants particular attention. 25 The BRT wor-
ries that, in the case of a labor dispute, union pension funds will place
a candidate on the ballot that will "excoriate current management
and ... criticize . . . the management policies at the heart of the un-
derlying labor dispute between the company and union., 26 Worse, "if
the union-backed candidate or candidates were elected, the prospects
of a bitterly divided and ultimately dysfunctional board are of course
quite real.",
27
The fear that shareholder access will provide unions and social ac-
tivists with substantial influence over board decisions does not seem
warranted. While the BRT does not seem to place much trust in the
voting decisions of shareholders, it is still a stretch to expect candi-
dates with a union or social activist agenda to have any meaningful
chance of being elected. Most shareholders are primarily focused on
enhancing share value, and they are highly unlikely to vote for a can-
didate with a labor agenda. As already noted, shareholder resolutions
that focus on labor or social issues are generally defeated by substan-
tial margins.
22 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 40; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 17.
23 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 40 (emphasis omitted); Castellani & Goodman,
supra note 1, manuscript at 17.
24 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 40-41; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1,
manuscript at 17-18.
25 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 41; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 18.
26 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 42; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 19.
27 BRT Comment Letter, supra note 1, at 42; Castellani & Goodman, supra note 1, manu-
script at 19.
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Nor is there basis for the fear that the shareholder access regime
will provide a union with a new and powerful "bully pulpit" to attack
a company with which the union has a labor dispute. To be sure, if
the union succeeds in meeting the ownership and holding require-
ments for placing a candidate on the ballot, the union will be able to
include a short statement criticizing management in the company's
proxy materials. But unions already can place such statements in the
proxy materials by proposing a shareholder resolution criticizing the
company's labor policies. Proposing such a shareholder resolution is
much simpler and easier than getting a candidate on the ballot would
be under the proposed rule.
It is worth noting that the view that shareholder access will provide
labor interests with more influence over the board is not shared by
other opponents of shareholder access. To the contrary, Martin Lip-
ton and Steven Rosenblum have argued that shareholder access will
lead boards to give less attention to the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies such as employees.2 8 Lipton and Rosenblum believe
that currently boards can be expected to take into account not only the
interests of shareholders but also the interests of other constituencies.
In their view, permitting shareholders to nominate directors would
make board decisions more focused on shareholder interests, to the
potential detriment of employees and other constituencies.
The prediction that shareholder access can be expected to make
boards more attentive to enhancing share value is warranted because
the key to director election is in the hands of shareholders that are
interested in enhancing share value. The BRT is therefore not justi-
fied in making the opposite prediction.29
Ill. CONCLUSION
The BRT has not provided any good substantive reasons for op-
posing shareholder access. The BRT's submission paints far too rosy
a picture of the current state of affairs, failing to undermine the view
that reform is needed to make shareholder power to replace a director
truly viable. It also paints far too bleak a picture of the consequences
28 See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy:
An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAW. 67 (2003).
29 As to Lipton and Rosenblum, while they are correct in predicting that shareholder ac-
cess will make boards more attentive to shareholder interests, they are not on solid ground when
arguing that this change will hurt employees. The problem with their argument is that, even
without the shareholder access rule, there is little basis for expecting directors to have substan-
tial overlap of interest with employees. Thus, board insulation form shareholders should not be
expected to operate to the benefit of employees. It is merely expected to protect management
slackness and under-performance, which hurt shareholders and might sometimes hurt employees
as well.
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of the proposed shareholder access rule, failing to show that it would
have significant adverse consequences. Overall, the BRT's submis-
sion does not provide a solid basis for its fierce opposition to the pro-
posed rule.
